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Abstract: 
 
Although sympathetic to my claims (“Moral theories in teaching applied ethics”), 
D Benatar argues that I have overlooked important roles that could be played 
by moral theories in the teaching of applied ethics. In this reply, I will consider 
the cases that Benatar suggests and, for each, I will suggest that there is an 
alternative approach which, as well as avoiding the costs discussed in my 
original paper, will also be a more effective response to that particular issue. 
 
AGAINST MORAL THEORIES – REPLY TO BENATAR 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In “Moral theories may have some role in teaching applied ethics”, D Benatar 
states that he is not sure how much talk about moral theories is compatible 
with my approach. He states that he is sympathetic to my arguments but 
claims that whether or not they are successful depends on what my conclusion 
actually is. Benatar claims that, if my claim is that moral theories should not be 
taught at all, or that there should be very little talk about theories, then my 
conclusion should be rejected. He argues that I have overlooked important roles 
that could be played by moral theories in the teaching of applied ethics.[1] 
I will consider each of these in turn, and will demonstrate that, in these 
cases Benatar overstates the benefit (or in some cases I will argue there is no 
benefit at all) and understates the costs (which will be the same costs 
highlighted in my previous paper [2]). 
 
 
CLARIFICATION 
 
I concede the fact that my paper wasn’t completely explicit about how much (if 
any) teaching of moral theories I would allow. Benatar may be disappointed to 
hear that this paper won’t be much more explicit. Rather than offering any kind 
of prescription, telling people how much (or how little) teaching you should have 
on moral theories, my aim was just to highlight the dangers of using moral 
theories. Being aware of the dangers, teachers can of course decide for 
themselves. Also, my paper did include the concession that the longer and the 
more thorough the course, the more likely it is that it might be appropriate to 
include some teaching of moral theories. 
 Nevertheless, in general, I am willing to accept Benatar’s characterization 
of my position – at least if we ignore more detailed and in depth study of applied 
ethics. In most cases, I do believe that “no more than very little talk about 
theories is compatible” with my arguments. 
 
 
BENATAR’S COUNTER-EXAMPLES 
 
Benatar offers a number of counter-examples to my conclusion that moral 
theories should not be discussed in detail when teaching applied ethics, 
demonstrating that the teaching of moral theories can be useful. In this reply, I 
will consider the cases that Benatar suggests and, for each, I will suggest that 
there is an alternative approach which, as well as avoiding the costs discussed 
in my original paper, will also be a more effective response to the particular 
issue considered. 
 
 
First: non-philosophers appeal to theoretical frameworks 
 
Benatar argues that, even without realizing, non-philosophers will often “appeal 
to theoretical frameworks when discussing practical moral problems.” As an 
example, he claims that students will often appeal to the consequences of an 
action when arguing. 
 I agree with the claim that students do sometimes appeal to theoretical 
frameworks, and also agree that students do appeal to consequences, but I fail 
to see why this gives us any reason to teach moral theories. 
 Benatar claims that “If students are introduced to moral theories, they 
will be able to identify this as a consequentialist argument.” 
 I have to confess, I cannot see what students would be missing out on if 
they don’t have a knowledge of moral theories and, thus, are unable to identify 
these arguments as “consequentialist arguments”. 
 The claim that an argument that appeals to consequences is a 
consequentialist argument is ambiguous. It could mean that an argument is 
consequentialist just as long as it is an argument that appeals to consequences. 
Alternatively, it could mean that an argument is consequentialist if it is an 
argument that relies in some sense on a consequentialist framework. 
 On the first interpretation, this doesn’t look informative. A student is not 
missing anything important by not knowing this. On the second interpretation, 
the statement is false. Pointing out that a particular act or policy would have 
negative (or positive) consequences is an important consideration that should 
be taken into account by anyone, and does not rely on a consequentialist 
framework. 
 Someone who says that x is wrong because x has certain bad 
consequences may be a consequentialist, but he needn’t be. He could be a 
Rossian pluralist. Or he may not fit neatly into either. The student might simply 
believe that the fact that x would have bad consequences is a reason to avoid x. 
 Thus, the claim that someone who appeals to the consequences of an 
action is appealing to a theoretical framework needn’t be true. More 
importantly, even if it is true, it is not clear that there is anything to be gained 
by teaching the student about moral theories. 
 Rather than teaching this student something about consequentialism, a 
better approach, I suggest, would be to ask him a further question: do you 
think that the consequences of the action are the only relevant considerations? 
 If the student says yes, then he is appealing to a theoretical framework 
after all. If not, he isn’t (or, at least, needn’t be). And if the student says yes, 
you can press him further, asking if he’s sure that he wants to commit himself 
to that claim. And, of course, you can present the student with difficult cases to 
challenge this belief. And, of course, these counter-examples may come from 
the literature on consequentialism, but this (I suggest) isn’t something the 
student needs to know. And if the student says no, or if he gives up the claim 
that only consequences matter, you can ask him what else he thinks matters, 
and then you can discuss those different issues too – and none of this requires 
the discussion of moral theories. 
 The particular argument that Benatar appeals to in relation to this is the 
back-street abortions argument against making abortion illegal. As I said above, 
Benatar claims that discussing moral theories with students allows the student 
to identify the argument as a consequentialist argument, and he goes on to say 
that the student will also be aware that the consequentialist approach is not 
uncontested. 
 I cannot see the benefit of considering this argument in this round about 
way. Rather than identifying the argument as a consequentialist argument, and 
then showing them that consequentialism is not uncontested (which doesn’t 
seem to leave the student in a better position to judge the argument than they 
were in the first place) why not address the argument directly? Confront them, 
for example, with David Oderberg’s reductio ad absurdum argument: 
 
I am disturbed by the number of backstreet contract killings being carried 
out by members of the Mafia and other gangland organisations. These 
murders are often bloody and excruciating. Some victims survive and are 
maimed for life. Unscrupulous operators, often untrained or semi-trained 
in the art of killing, receive thousands of dollars for their acts. A whole 
black market in contract killing has arisen. I propose to solve the problem 
by taking contract killing out of the backstreet and into the hands of the 
state.[3] 
 
A discussion of consequentialism is not required. 
 Ultimately, Benatar claims that the value of discussing theories is not to 
lay a theoretical foundation, but to expose theoretical assumptions. This is a 
useful distinction, but I question the need to appeal to moral theories in order 
to expose theoretical assumptions. Instead, it is, I suggest, better to question 
the students, probing deeper, and then challenge each of the more foundational 
beliefs in turn. As I suggested above, you can simply ask the student: “Do you 
believe that it is only the consequences that matter?” 
 Benatar also claims that his approach pre-empts another problem that I 
identified – that students might adopt a form of relativism according to which 
the answers to ethical questions are relative to moral theories. Benatar offers 
two responses to this. First, the students will know that they “do not know 
enough to choose among the theories.” Second, “Students can be taught the 
important lesson… that just because there is disagreement – even an 
unresolved one – this does not mean that every view is correct.” 
 I agree with the second point, and would stress that it is essential that 
students are taught this, but students can be taught this whether we discuss 
moral theories or not, so it is not clear how this point is supposed to help 
Benatar’s approach, or to pre-empt this problem. 
The first point seems more relevant, but seems to be almost as 
undesirable as the relativism I was keen to avoid. Indeed, I am tempted to think 
that, when I thought of it as a form of relativism to start with, I may have 
simply misidentified the phenomenon. Maybe Benatar’s account is more 
accurate. It is not that the students are relativists, it’s just that they think they 
are qualified to say, “this conclusion follows if we are consequentialists”, and 
“this conclusion follows if we are deontologists” but then think they are 
unqualified to say anything else and they simply give up. They are unable to 
say anything more than that, because (given the complexities of some of the 
moral theories) they do not know enough to choose between them.  
So what they learn is that the purpose of their classes in ethics is to 
identify what a consequentialist would say about an issue, and what a 
deontologist would say about an issue, and then concede that they are 
unqualified to say anything else. 
 If this is the outcome of this approach, I cannot see why anyone would 
think that this was a point in favour of discussing moral theories. 
  
Second: students hold stronger opinions about practical issues 
 
Benatar claims that students “often hold much stronger opinions about 
practical issues than they do about theoretical ones” and then argues that a 
discussion of moral theory “can introduce students to philosophical reasoning 
via issues about which students may be less defensive and more open-minded.” 
 I have to confess that I am unsure what I want to say about this. On the 
one hand, I want to ask if it is necessarily a bad thing that students are 
passionate about an issue. It seems to me, this could be another reason in 
favour of discussing the practical issues directly, rather than the more 
theoretical issues. 
 That said, in some cases at least, I think I ought to accept the claim that 
it might be beneficial to discuss issues in which the students will be open-
minded and less defensive. But we should note that Benatar says “The skills, 
even if not the theories, can then be applied and developed further in 
discussion of practical problems.” 
 If this is the argument that Benatar is appealing to, we should note that 
he is not using the moral theory as a method of getting to the answer to a 
particular question. Rather, he is using it as a training ground. If this is the 
benefit of teaching moral theories, and if Benatar accepts that there are costs 
involved in teaching moral theories, wouldn’t it be better to stick to applied 
ethics, but to take this consideration into account when deciding the order of 
the topics. So, if we accept the claim that we don’t want to start with the topics 
where students might have stronger opinions and closed minds, we can leave 
those topics for later, and start with something else. But the something else 
needn’t be moral theory – it could just be less contentious topics in applied 
ethics – and we can use these topics as the training ground. 
 I was a little surprised that Benatar didn’t defend the use of moral 
theories by saying that we could abstract away from the particular case, talking 
at the level of moral theories, where the students would be less passionate and 
more considered, and then apply that to the case, demonstrating what they are 
committed to. 
 Although Benatar didn’t offer this response, I suspect others will want to, 
and therefore I will respond to this argument too. To some extent, I am 
sympathetic to this approach. However, my response is just to point out that 
there are alternative approaches that have the same advantages, but without 
the problems raised in my original paper. 
 First, one approach can be to consider two different issues 
simultaneously, so that you can draw comparisons between the two, and 
highlight apparent contradictions. Then the student is forced to acknowledge 
that they need either to give up one of their views, or they need to work hard in 
order to explain away the apparent contradiction. [4] 
 In these cases, it is an advantage that the students will be passionate 
about these issues. If you confront students with an apparent contradiction in 
some abstract moral theory, students may simply shrug their shoulders. They 
may not care about the contradiction if they cannot see the implications it has 
for issues that they are passionate about. However, if a student is confronted 
with an apparent contradiction between two of their own beliefs, both of which 
the student is passionate about and keen to defend, the student is more likely 
to engage with the issues and is more likely to consider the issues more 
carefully. In this case, it may well be their indifference and lack of passion that 
leads to them having a closed mind, and their passion that leads to an open, 
enquiring mind, wanting to explore the issue further in order to resolve the 
issue. 
 Second, another possible use of moral theories is to use the discussion of 
moral theories to question the students’ more foundational beliefs. As I argued 
in relation to Benatar’s first point, you can do this without appealing to moral 
theories. You can, for example, ask simple questions like: do you really believe 
that it is only the consequences that matter? 
If their passion is preventing them from considering the other side of the 
argument, this method can be used to take a step back, and consider an issue 
they are less passionate about. But this step backwards needn’t take us all the 
way back into a discussion of moral theories. 
 In short, if the argument is that moral theories can be used as training 
grounds, my response is that there are other training grounds, and, if the 
argument is that we can use moral theories to abstract away from the 
particular issues to argue about the issues more dispassionately before 
applying our conclusions to the particular case, there are ways of doing this 
that have similar advantages but avoid the problems associated with teaching 
moral theories. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 As Benatar points out, whether my arguments are successful or not depends on 
what my conclusion is. If I commit myself to the stronger conclusion that moral 
theories should not be taught at all (which I think I might, at least in relation to 
the amount of ethics teaching that will be received by a typical medical student) 
then I accept that there may be counter examples. There may be some cases in 
which the teaching of moral theories would be useful. However, if there are any 
counter examples, I don’t believe that Benatar has identified them. 
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